ANTRODUCTION
It is one thing to observe the changes that have taken place over the last ten years in the size and character of the U.S. military presence in East Asia and the Western Pacific.
It is quite another to forecast the nature of that presence ten years from now', One is, of course, tempted simply to extrapolate the past into the future.
Some succumb to %.hat temptation. They look at the U.S.
withdrawal from Vietnam and Thailand. They look at the reduction in the strength of the U.S. forces that remain in Korea and the Western Pacific. They look at the refocusing of U.S. security concerns on Europe.
And based on what they see they conclude that the United States is retreating from Asia.
But simple extrapolation often misleads; and it clearly does so in this case. One reason is obvious: in concentrating on change one tends to neglect stability, and in certain fundamental respects the U.S. military presence in the Asian-Pacific region ha3n't chanqed at all. There is another, less obvious but in the long run more important reauon as well: the processes that brought about the changes that have taken place in that presence over of the last ten years, and those likely to produce change during the next ten years, are quite different.
Ten years ago the U.S. Pacific Command had/fa more men, ships, and aircraft than it has today, But ten years ago the Navy, will be discussed at some lenjth below. This concentration on naval forces should not obscure two facts: although probably the most useful (and certainly the most used), the Navy is not the only element of U. The first factor is the complex of threats perceived to be posed to the United States, its allies and its interests in the region. Now and for the foreseeable future, the Soviet Union can be judged the most important source of such threats.* This has not always been the case, however, and the Soviet Union should not be seen as their n source. 3 The second factor is the estimated requirement for U.S.
forces in the region. This estimate has two components.* One is derived from assessments of the ability of allies to defend themselves and their vital interests. The other is derived from identification of the forces necessary for the direct defense of the United States (given a certain strategy for the conduct of that defense), the additional forces necessary to augment allies' defenses (given established policies regarding the nature and extent of such assistance and a certain strategy for providing *This is not the appropriate point Eor an extended discussion of threats, either real or perceived. Suffice it to say that, in the opinion of this observer, and in regard to the three values noted (self, allies, interests), the Soviets are the primary source of threat in northeast Asia and the Pacific. That threat is significant.
And it is increasing --albeit gradually.
-4-it), and whatever else may be involved in the protection and promotion of U.S. overseas interests.
The third faqtor is the actual availability of U.S. forces for use in the region. Availability has three antecedents. One is the size and configuration of the U.S. force structure. Another is. competition among requirements for those forces. The last is the priorities according to which those fprces are allocated to meet these requirements.
This discussion concentrates on two of those factors: requirements for and availability of forces. Neither is as well or as wiiely understood as it should be; and understanding the dynamics of both is important. It is especially important when, as in this discussion, one focuses not on a whole (the U.S. Navy) but on one of its parts (a constituent fleet). It is natural to assume that changes in that fleet are linked to developments in its operating environment, and very Qften that is so. But sometimes it is not.
Some of the changes that have taken place in the Pacific
Fleet over the last ten years are direct reflections of specific developments in the region; they would not have taken place had those developments not occurred. Other changes, however, although played out in the Pacific, had their origins elsewhere; they would have taken place regardless of what was going on in the region.
Confusing the two can lead to misundersttnding both the intentions behind, and the limits on, such changes. From the U.S. perspective, the first thing likely to be noted is the primary cause of the reduction in the strength of the Pacific Fleet: the reduction in the overall size of the U.S. Navy.
In 1968, its active general purpose force strength was 932
ships; by early 1978 that number had dropped to 418 (see table 1 ).
Changes of this magnitude are dramatic under any circumstances. This reduction in the overall strength of the U.S. Navy -6- result could be readily reversed, this reduction was accomplished primarily by sending them to the scrap yard.
The differences 4etween these two reductions in overall U.S.
naval strength are important. The immediate post World War II cutback was initiated because then existing naval force levels were considered to be in excess of requirements. The reduction in strength in the early 1970s was carried out despite the fact that then existing naval force levels were considered to be below requirements --because, to put it bluntly, it had to be. 6 A significant fraction of the Navy was reaching the end of its useful life. These ships had been built during or shortly after World War II. Many had been modified subsequently in the attempt to keep pace with developments in sensors arta weaponry, but technology was forging ahead and it was not considered cost-effective to attempt to modify them further. They had to be replaced. In or-iI, dcr to help pay for their replacements, which clearly were going to be expensive, current costs had to be reduced substantially.* This meant significant numbers of the older, less effective ships in the force had to go. They went.
The But neither of these developments was the driving factor in the reduction in the strength of the U.S. Navy. Given the resource reallocations brought about by Vietnam, it would have occurred anyway.
*Ordinarily, resources would have been provided well before such retirements became necessary so this replacement process could proceed in an orderly fashion. In this case, the War in Vietnam had absorbed those resources. **Perceived as a potential inhibition to aggressive action on the mainland by either party.
The reduction in the overall strength of the U.S. Navy, however, was the driving factor in the reduction in the strength of the Pacific Fleet. And the latter, rather than any U.S. desire to -withdraw from Asia, was the cause of the eventual reduction in the strength of its forward deployments to the Western Pacific. U.S.
ends had not changed. The Pacific Fleet simply no longer possessed the means to continue steaming as before. Evidence for the consistency of the U.S. commitment can be found in a variety of places, including the geographical disposition of its naval forces. For years, these forces have been divided almost equally (55%-45%) between the Atlantic and Pacific
WHAT HAS NOT CHANGED
Fleets. Most deviations from this norm are readily explicable. 8 Some reflect technical considerations.* Others reflect operational considerations. The latter are more indicative of U.S.
intent. The most significant of these have occurred when the United States was engaged in combat (in Asia) and forces were withdrawn from the fleet that was not fighting (the Atlantic Fleet)
to augment the fleet that was (the Pacific Fleet).
During the War in Vietnam, for example, the United States stripped many of the more capable systems from its forces deployed in or earmarked for Europe and sent them to Southeast Asia.
When the war ended, it acted to reverse that process and restore the geographical balance. 9 Throughout, its commitment to honor its obligations to its European allies remained unchanged, even though the means it had on hand to do so varied significantly --as good an indication as any that the strength of U.S. forces *The major deviation is in strategic forces. Target locations and missile ranges dictate that some 75% of the U.S. ballistic missile submarine force be located in the Atlantic. The first of those determinants was the perceived threat to the U.S., its allies, and its interests. Certainly the most immediate threat to these values now and for the foreseeable future is that represented by the combination of the increasing dependence of the industrialized nations on Persian Gulf oil and the obvious fragility of the flow of oil to them from the Gulf --a fragility that on the one hand already has been demonstrated at the source and on the other hand is inherent along sea lines of communication. 13 A less imminent but potentially far more important threat to these values is that posed by another combination:
increasing Soviet naval capabilities inthe Pacific and increasing its own state and ideological interests overseas--especially,
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__ w but by no fneans exclusively, in the Third World. 1 4 The threat posed by conflicts resulting from increasing competition for control of the resources located jn And under the sea is difficult to assess, but cannot be overlooked.
1 5
The second determinant was the requirement for U.S. forces.
Alliedcapabilities to defend themselves an their vital interests are increasing, and should continue to do so. However, they are not likely to increase to the point where they offset the principal threats outlined above. Thus the requirement for U.S. forces to augment allied defenpes --particularly those of Japan and Korea --in time of need can be taken aq a given for the foreseeable future. On the other hand, precisely how the United States will render that assistance appears not to be as certain. The strategies that have prevailed until now are being reconsidered, and the outcome of that process is likely to have a significant impact on the composition of Pacific Fleet forces, the stance they adopt in peacetime, and the character of the operations they will undertake in wartime. 1 6 The fact that the introduction of new weapons and sensors has already increased the combat capabilities of the Soviet navy substantially, and the prospect that it will continue to do so, also will have a significant impact on V.S.
requirements.17
The third determinant of the U.S. naval posture in the Pacific was the availability of forces. This remains the key to the -15- future of that posture, but on entirely different grounds now.
The decline in overall U.S. Naval strength appears to have ended.
Active strength can now be expected to stabilize near its present level and then grow somewhat.* Meanwhile, the capabilities of exiting units are being upgraded significantly as they receive new types of offensive and defensive weapons systems and sensors.
HARPOON, the F-14/PHOENIX combination and towed array sonars are good examples of these improvements. To some extent, this increase in unit capability offsets the decline that has taken place in the Navy's numerical strength and at the same time reduces the number of replacement units that must be acquired --600 or so of today's units should provide a greater overall capability than the 900 or so of years past. The capabilities of potential opponents have increased as well, however, and, while the "reach" of naval combat systems has increased markedly, the simple fact remains that no ship can be in two places at the same time.
Competing requirements, and priorities for the allocation of forces among those requirements, are likely to play an increasing i role in determining the availability of forces for use in the Pacific. Some of this competition is geographical: Asian versus
:1
European requirements, the requirement to not only assist in the direct defense of allies in Europe and Asia but insure the flow of *As indicated below, the extent of this future growth remains to be detetmined.
-but by no means exclusively, in the Third World. 1 4 The threat posed by conflicts resulting from increasing competition for control of the resources located n and under the sea is difficult to assess, but cannot be ovqrlooked. 1 5 The second determinant was the requirement for U.S. forces.
Allied capabilities to defend themselves and their vital interests are increasing, and should continue to do so. However, they are not likely to increase to the point where they offset the principal threats outlined above. Thus the requirement for U.S. forces to augment allied defenses --particularly those of Japan and Korea --in time of need can be taken aq a given for the foreseeable future. On the other hand, precisely how the Pnited States will render that assistance appears not to be as certain. The strategies that have prevailed until now are being reconsidered, and the outcome of that process is likely to have a significant impact on the composition of Pacific Fleet forces, the stance they adopt in peacetime, and the character of the operations they will undertake in wartime. 1 6 The fact that the introduction of new weapons and sensors has already increased the combat capabilities of the Soviet navy substantially, and the prospect that it will continue to do so, also will have a significant impact on U.S. requirements. 17 The third determinant of the U.S. naval posture in the Pacific was the availability 9f forces. This remains the key to the especially the Soviet Union --and the impact of tlat threat on the ability of US. naval forces to accomplish their assigned tasks. 9 The second question concerns the ability of the United States to design and construct a diffprent navy, one that will be not only less vulnerable to, but more effective in the face of, that opposition.
There are few, if any, obvious answers to these questions (if there were, this reappraisal would have been completed in short order). And it is difficult to believe that the more fundamen-*The balance between the forces maintained in the Atlantic and those maintained in the Pacifici the 0alance between forces continuously deployed forward and those kept at the ready in home waters for deployment in specific contingencies.
-19-L tal issues involved will be reisolved satisfactorily in the near term. The eventual outcome of this process is bound to be influenced heavily not only by estimates of present and future threats and the forces best suited to countering them, but also by the specific strategies considered most appropriate for the employment of those forces. As a result, it is difficult to predict what that outcome will be.
On t-he other hand, it is not difficult to identify the two issues that will go furthest in determining the eventual shape of the U.3. Navy. One concerns the continuing utility of the aircraft carrier, the other concerns the criteria by which decisions about the future naval force structure are made --in particular, the extent to which the immediate, theater-specific requirements of one particular scenario, a full-scale conventional war in Europe, are to govern the selection of optimal unit capabilities and a mix of forces for the Navy as a whole, including that portion of the Navy intended for use in other theaters like the Pacific.20
The resolution of these issues will have little immediate impact on the shape of the Navy, and by extension the Pacific It can be argued (although one shouldn't attempt to take the argument too far) that earlier, when the U.S. Navy was numerically stronger, when many of the tasks it might be called upon to perform were less demanding, and when the combat capabilitien of potential opponents like the $oviet Navy were not what they are today, it could concentrate in any region forces adequate to accomplish those tasks, and sustain them there for an extended *For instance, even if it were concluded that the aircraft j carrier should be abandoned --which is extremely unlikely --that I decision could not be implemented until alternative means of performing the carriers' current functions had been developed and those new forces had been acquired in adequate numbers.
-21-period, without placing excessive strain on the entire system --in particular, without necessitating the withdrawal of forces in significant numbers from one ocean to augment those in another.
That clearly is not the case today (and has not been for some tLme) .22
There arp three regions of major concern to the United States in which employment of its military forces is readily conceivable. The Pacific Fleet is also a prime source of forces for operations in the Middle East. This is especially the case in situations where it is necessary to insure the continued flow of oil to the United States and its allies. Should that flow be threatened, forces undoubtedly would be moved from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean to protect it. But again, net requirements would prevail.
The United States, for instance, has an obligation to assist Japan in defending itself. The defense of Japan, however, clearly now includes the defense of its oil supplies. 2 3 Where threatened, i both must be protected; but this must be accomplished without given the increasing capabilities of potential opponents and the expanding scope of the threats that must be dealt with, should those threats actually materialize, it is the capabilities of tre entire force that will in the end decide the issue. 
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